We are not yet at the point where the Russian Federation is engaging in open colonialism in Africa, but it is increasingly seeking to expand its influence on the continent, or at least to maintain it where its authority has been eroded by, for say, Tuareg rebels. What are the possibilities and limits of Russian expansion on the „black continent” in 2025? What is the current situation, and what can we expect?
Last year there were doubts about how far Russia could go in its international relations with Africa. Ongoing aggression against Ukraine, low trade indicators, the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, and lower-than-expected attendance at the Russia-Africa Summit in 2023 led to the feeling that Moscow would eventually decide to reduce its commitments in Africa to focus on the war against Ukraine.
But 2024 proved that some of these doubts were premature. The Russian government has asserted its presence across the continent, taking advantage of African governments’ ignorance of the Russian-Ukrainian war, their critical miscalculations, and the relative reluctance of Western governments. Although there are serious questions about the sustainability of Moscow’s presence, the Kremlin has proven determined to expand in Africa.
The numbers speak for themselves: two new embassies have opened and three more have been announced; six new Russian House cultural centers have been inaugurated and more are expected; trade is expected to reach a record $24 billion by the end of 2024; and dozens of memorandums of understanding will be signed between African and Russian companies; Fewer diplomatic missions have taken place, but the same number of senior-level meetings have been held, including the first Russian-African ministerial summit; 2 new Wagner/Africa Corps formations have been deployed (to Niger and Equatorial Guinea), and there is an overall increased military presence of Russian forces on the continent. (The highest available estimate of the total number of Russian military personnel on the continent is around 6,000). What factors have made this expansion possible? What might prevent the expansion of Russia’s relations with the continent?
External Factors and Internal Drivers
The European Union has been marginalized in Africa for several years. First, the French-led Sahel stabilization complex has been an outright strategic failure, with the closure of European and U.S. missions in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (and the threat of further closures) following three coups. Second, the EU’s global network of contacts has struggled to translate the bloc’s economic weight – Africa is a $288 billion trading partner – into further influence. Third, Europe has image problems in many parts of Africa, as widespread anti-French sentiment affects the bloc more broadly. Russia, on the other hand, is consistently better perceived in Africa than in other regions of the world.
Meanwhile, the U.S. remains relatively popular on the continent, either as the most popular foreign country or second only to China. The administration of Democratic President Joe Biden has increased Washington’s engagement with Africa, hosting 49 high-level delegations to the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. However, Biden only visited Africa once as president, and Trump’s comments on the continent include the infamous „shithole countries” remark. Expectations are, therefore, that Washington will remain aloof and even confrontational on African non-alignment.
China is seen as the beneficiary of Western restrictions in Africa, but its role on the continent is also changing. For many years, China has been seen as a rising power – even a potential hegemon – in Africa, but it is increasingly moving from „financial diplomacy” to military engagement. Chinese lending and investment in Africa have been declining for years, with loans falling from a peak of $30 billion in 2016 to $4.6 billion in 2023. However, China is becoming an increasingly important arms exporter and defense cooperation partner on the continent, with a growing number of Chinese security companies operating in Africa.
As the West and China restructure their engagements, several new players, including Turkey and India, are emerging, including on issues such as defense and security. As these engagements show, Africa is open for business. With few exceptions, African countries pursue what Jorge Heine calls „active non-alignment” in their foreign policies. Faced with the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Hamas-Israeli war, and the looming resumption of the Sino-US trade war, many countries of the Global South are choosing to stay out of major conflicts. This policy is more than neutral; it is proactive and security-oriented. In this context, Moscow’s involvement in their affairs is less about loyalty to Russia or the Soviet Union and more about opportunity.
What are the limits of expansion?
Of course, Russia continues to face difficulties in matching rhetoric and means in Africa. Africa’s share of Russia’s total trade remains at around 5%, and much of this is concentrated in North Africa, with Egypt accounting for the largest share. Moreover, Russia has not been a major investor in Africa since 1991, and development aid is a fraction of its pre-Cold War levels. These factors make Russia a „virtual superpower” for Africa, a situation that Moscow struggles to overcome.
In 2024, several constraints on growth have emerged, including in the defense sector. Foremost among these is the possible loss of the Russian bases in Syria, the Tartus naval base, and the Hmeimim air base, which served as key logistical hubs for the air and sea supply of personnel and materiel for all Wagner and Africa Corps deployments in Africa. Since the fall of its former „ally,” Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Moscow has been using diplomacy to try to reach an agreement over the bases, with Russian state-controlled media publishing material critical of Assad. Alternative locations for the bases are scarce, with Libya and Sudan seen as precarious substitutes.
The July battle of Tinzawaten, in which Tuareg rebels routed Russian and Malian personnel, shattered the image of Russian invincibility in Africa. The following months brought more difficulties as the junta failed to regain the initiative in northern Mali. Russia’s role as the continent’s arms supplier declined in 2024, as Moscow had to rely on its junta partners in the central Sahel and Sudan to keep its African exports afloat.
Part of the tension is due to the war with Ukraine. While Russia was relatively popular in the 2024 African Youth Survey, fewer respondents saw the U.S. as a negative influence on the continent (19% of respondents) than those who saw Russia as a negative influence (30%). 46% of the latter group believed that Russia’s „involvement in conflicts” (including Ukraine) negatively impacted Africa. Similarly, a 2023 IPSOS survey found that a majority of respondents in Africa support Ukraine over the war, with more respondents (over 50%) expressing active support for Kyiv than for Moscow (over 20%). A 2024 survey of experts found a single-digit minority of South African experts willing to support Russia in its aggression against Ukraine, with the majority favoring neutrality.
The implication is that at the end of 2024, Russia will remain a virtual superpower in Africa, capable of reaching every country on the continent. However, low trade indicators and uneven popularity make it impossible for Moscow to build an influential pro-Russian coalition of African governments outside the AES and a few other clients. Moreover, the narrative of multipolarity in Africa is perceived through the lens of active non-alignment rather than Moscow’s messianic interpretation.
If the current trajectory of the war is maintained, the picture in 2025 will remain the same. Still, the difficulties will increase with Russia’s growing economic burden and the fall of the Assad regime. (Indeed, many of Russia’s missions in Africa have depended on the logistics provided by the Hmeimim airbase and the Tartus naval base). For Western and Ukrainian diplomacy, preventing further Russian gains must be incorporated into the strategy of supporting Ukraine’s war of self-defense since Moscow sees the European front as something linked to Africa and Ukraine.
Therefore, Russia will continue to have one foot in Africa for some time. But this foot is already numb, and the shoe is hurting…
Source: https://ridl.io/russia-africa-2024-in-review-opportunities-drivers-and-limits-for-moscow-s-continental-expansion/
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