As you know, in November and December, Romania held parliamentary elections and the first round of presidential elections, which were later declared invalid. The winning candidate’s campaign, the far-right politician Călin Georgescu, was the product of orchestrated foreign manipulation. Dubbed the „Romanian Orban,” Georgescu promoted a Euroskeptic, anti-NATO, pro-Russian, and anti-Ukrainian narrative. His surge in popularity was fueled by twenty-five thousand TikTok accounts that artificially boosted his visibility in the run-up to election day.
The electoral process was then resumed, starting with re-registration and vetting of candidates, while the EU launched an investigation into TikTok on suspicion of meddling in the Romanian elections.
Interestingly, according to an INSCOP survey commissioned by the media, Russia comes last regarding positive perception among Romanians. So, how did the rhetoric of the pro-Putin candidate resonate in Romanian society? How does propaganda infiltrate the Romanian information space? And most importantly, how can these challenges be addressed?
To explore these questions, the Ukrainian fact-checking website Detector Media spoke with political scientist Susana Dragomir, an expert in strategic communication and a specialist in the Romanian context.
– Can you tell us about your background and current work?
– I am currently working on my Ph.D. dissertation on the EU and anti-Western disinformation in the cyber age, a topic I have studied for more than six years. My research started in 2018, focusing on Russian propaganda in Romania. Previously, I worked as a strategic and political communication advisor at the European Parliament for more than 11 years. I now work as a strategic communication consultant, while continuing my research.
– How does Russian propaganda penetrate Romania compared to other countries like Ukraine or Moldova?
– Romania’s case is unique. Historical tensions make it difficult to promote pro-Russian sentiments – because there are hardly any. Instead, Russian narratives are aimed at creating anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiments and weakening trust in Western alliances.
The Kremlin’s strategy is sophisticated. Russia presents itself as a defender of Christian values, in contrast to the image of the EU, which is often portrayed as a supporter of liberal and LGBTQ ideals.
The means of communication are key. Russia uses alternative media platforms and far-right social media bubbles to spread its narratives. While official Russian channels have been shut down, alternative sources have proliferated. In my research, I identified about 300 websites spreading pro-Russian propaganda in Romania, often overlapping with anti-EU, anti-Ukraine, and even anti-vaccination content. These bubbles became active during the pandemic and have since shifted to anti-Western narratives.
– You mentioned religious disinformation as a significant factor. Could you be more specific?
– Orthodox Christian narratives are often used to spread propaganda. These narratives draw heavily on Alexander Dugin’s pan-Slavic concept of the „Third Rome,” which portrays Moscow as the rightful successor to ancient Rome and the EU as a dictatorship that threatens traditional values (although the „Third Rome” concept is a centuries-old delusion).
This propaganda is reinforced by radical Orthodox groups, far-right influencers, and even some high-ranking church officials. Archbishop Theodosius of Tomis, for example, has openly praised figures like Dugin and Putin. Meanwhile, networks of religious influencers spread pro-Russian messages on the Internet, often under the guise of defending traditional Christian values.
One example is Kallistrat, a monk with a substantial online presence on Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok. His content mixes orthodox Christian imagery and memes with anti-EU, anti-NATO, and anti-Ukraine propaganda. His messages are profoundly misogynistic and have even made headlines for inciting violent behavior.
– Who else is controlling these narratives?
– Beyond religious figures, we have seen the involvement of far-right political figures such as Georgescu, a recent presidential candidate. He is notorious for making inflammatory claims, such as that Ukrainian children in Romania receive 3700 lei per month in subsidies, while Romanian children receive only 249 lei.
Georgescu’s campaign has mixed religious rhetoric with neo-fascist and nationalist motifs. He also relied heavily on artificial intelligence-generated content, bots, and personalized social media messages, setting a new precedent for disinformation-driven elections in Romania.
– Does this mean that social media is the primary channel for disinformation?
– Not entirely. Russian propaganda infiltrates social media and traditional channels. Some journalists and media platforms serve as conduits for these narratives.
A more important issue is media control. The Romanian authorities have failed to effectively regulate the information space. Russian agents have conducted „social mapping” and identified vulnerabilities in Romanian society, such as economic inequalities, distrust of institutions, and a weak education system. These vulnerabilities are then exploited to spread divisive narratives.
In addition, the Romanian electoral system was subject to eighty-five thousand (85,000) cyber-attacks during the elections. This is not an insignificant problem. This is a real war. It is getting stronger and more invincible, and our response must be equally strong. This requires a NATO-wide approach. On a positive note, there was a recent call in Brussels for NATO countries to spend 3% of their GDP on defense. So, let us be more optimistic and hope that we can still defend ourselves.
– The success of the far-right candidate in the Romanian elections has shocked many. What do you think?
– Like many, I did not expect Georgescu to win in the first round. I thought that Simeon, another far-right candidate, would win. But Georgescu’s campaign revealed the extent of polarization in Romania.
His success was aided by his masterful use of personalized targeting on social media. Each demographic group was fed targeted messages: religious groups were promised a return to traditional values, women were told what they wanted to hear, and young people were offered a narrative of hope and change. This level of social engineering was unprecedented in Romania.
– How can Romania and the EU counter this hybrid warfare?
– We need to move from a reactive to a proactive approach. First of all, education is key. Schools must teach media literacy and critical thinking, but these efforts take time.
Second, enforcement is key. Those deliberately spreading disinformation and serving hostile foreign interests should face legal consequences. It is no longer just about rumor-mongering or pre-dissemination but also about accountability.
Third, the EU must rethink its communication strategy. Current communication is too technical, elitist, and unattractive to the general public. The EU needs to speak directly to citizens, highlighting the tangible benefits of membership in a way that ordinary people can understand.
Finally, we must accept that we are at war – a hybrid war. A reactive approach will not work. Social media is evolving faster than we can control it, and platforms like TikTok and Telegram have become hotbeds of disinformation.
– What about the broader geopolitical implications?
– The Romanian situation is not isolated. It is part of Moscow’s broader strategy to create a pro-Russian zone around Ukraine. Disinformation campaigns in Moldova, Georgia, and other neighboring countries follow a similar pattern, aimed at isolating Ukraine and destabilizing Western allies.
Romania is key in supporting Ukraine by providing trade corridors and strategic cooperation. For Russia, Romania’s disruption weakens this support and gives it greater access to strategic areas such as the Danube corridor.
– What will happen tomorrow?
– It is a new Cold War, and we must wake up to the realities of hybrid warfare. Europe must address its internal vulnerabilities, including social inequality, corruption, and lack of education, while strengthening its defense capabilities.
The EU must also act swiftly to counter Russian influence within its borders. This includes monitoring financial flows, exposing Russian agents, and holding platforms responsible for spreading harmful narratives to account.
Ultimately, this is not just about Romania or Ukraine. It is about surviving democratic values against a sophisticated and ruthless adversary.
Well, the war seems to be on, if not yet on the physical plane. There is only one thing Europe can do now: it must win.
Source: https://en.detector.media/post/disinformation-is-a-weapon-and-we-are-at-war-an-expert-on-hybrid-threats-in-romania
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