As we all know, on December 27, the German president officially dissolved the Bundestag, paving the way for early elections on February 23. According to polls, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is second. In its 11-year history, the party has evolved from a populist movement into a far-right force – an organization with extremist elements.
AfD voters accept their party’s radicalism, as many of them had previously voted reluctantly for the conservatives, who moved to a near-centrist position under Angela Merkel’s leadership. As a result, the AfD’s 2025 program will be significantly more radical than that of other European right-wing parties. The AfD platform calls, among other things, for Germany’s withdrawal from the European Union, a return to the Deutsche Mark, the resumption of Russian gas imports, the lifting of sanctions against Russia, and the pre-trial detention of asylum seekers. However, the AfD will likely remain in opposition, as no other party is willing to form a coalition due to its radicalism.
The path to the far right
The 2010s have seen significant changes in the traditional German political landscape. Franz Josef Strauß’s famous saying that it is unacceptable for any parliamentary party to exist to the right of the CDU/CSU has lost its relevance. The formation of the Alternative for Germany broke old taboos, and in 2013, the year of the founding congress, the party almost entered the Bundestag.
In the following years, the populist-right party won seats in parliaments at all levels. Even its staunchest opponents cannot deny that the AfD has consolidated its place in the political spectrum of the Federal Republic despite the movement’s growing extremism.
Perhaps even many Germans have forgotten that the original initiators of the project were far from radical right-wingers. The founder and first party president, Bernd Lucke, professor of economics at the University of Hamburg, originally proposed a financial-economic alternative to Angela Merkel’s policies. His approach resembled contemporary Trumpism: he favored national self-interest and strict protectionism over pan-European solidarity and open markets. Although this idea was rejected by most democratic politicians in Germany, it was not rooted in far-right ideology.
However, influential figures and political strategists within the AfD were not satisfied with the option of remaining a small party of „rebel professors”. They saw a significant part of the electorate that had not yet found representation in mainstream politics: staunch opponents of migration, multiculturalism, diversity, globalization, and European unity. For the German far right, electoral options were limited: they could – reluctantly – continue to vote for the conservatives, who had drifted to a near-centrist position under Angela Merkel; they could cast their votes for smaller extremist parties such as the NPD, which had no realistic chance of winning parliamentary seats; or they could withdraw from the electoral process altogether. But now they had an „alternative” of their own.
Ultimately, the trajectory of the party was shaped by the combined effect of three factors:
– The ideological orientation of the AfD’s membership,
– The ideological orientation of the AfD’s ideology,
– The ambition of previously low-ranking politicians and public figures to rise to the forefront of the German political scene.
Overall, the project was successful. The AfD displaced other far-right forces (some of which were forced to disband completely), gained broad government representation (in the Bundestag, the 16 state parliaments, the European Parliament, and almost all local governments across the country), and became the dominant force to the right of the CDU/CSU.
Less than a decade ago, Germany was a unique bastion of democratic stability. Now, like many other European states, a far-right political party has entered parliament. The reasons for this development include a marked shift to the right (as far as the law allows), opposition from large sections of society, surveillance by German intelligence agencies, and continued internal turmoil within the party. The AfD has undergone three internal coups, replacing the former leadership with more radical individuals.
The former leaders of Alternative for Germany have openly criticized their old party. Joerg Meuthen, who co-chaired the party until 2022, said. It even took on the characteristics of a sect during the pandemic. It is a party you cannot vote for”.
„I am sorry to see what the party has become. We wanted a different policy on the euro, and now this party wants a different country,” complained Bernd Lucke, the AfD’s first chairman, who held the post from 2013 to 2015.
A pre-election reorganization?
After the collapse of the governing coalition – and with the early parliamentary elections scheduled for February 23 – experts do not rule out a decline in AfD radicalism. They point to the example of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s „Italian Brotherhood” party, which has distanced itself from classic post-fascist positions, and Marine Le Pen, leader of the French National Alliance, who is now trying to give the impression of a national conservative rather than a far-right activist.
Hopes are currently pinned on the AfD’s current leader, Alice Weidel, an openly gay woman. She is running against the party’s other co-leader, Tino Chrupalla, who is known for his anti-migrant and pro-Putin rhetoric. Weidel’s statements in favor of same-sex partnerships, her agreement to invite skilled migrants to Germany, and her general support for Germany’s membership in the EU are seen as a moderate alternative to the extremist factions within the party. Notably, in December, Weidel, not Chrupalla, became the AfD’s candidate for chancellor.
Voters seem to have taken notice. In mid-December, a survey of trust in the politicians at the top of their party’s electoral list gave Weidel 21% – the same as conservative leader Friedrich Merz, who is touted as the next chancellor. Trust in Weidel even exceeds the general perception of her party in the same period (18-19%).
Scandals do not matter
The year 2024 was particularly rich in scandals involving the AfD. In January, journalists published information about a secret meeting of far-right extremists to discuss a „re-immigration” plan – the removal from Germany of foreign-born people deemed „undesirable,” even if they have German citizenship. Leading members of the AfD attended the meeting. Björn Höcke, the leader of the party’s far-right wing, demanded „exclusive loyalty” from all German residents with immigrant roots and threatened to deport those who were „undecided.”
In the run-up to the European Parliament elections in May, the AfD’s two leading candidates – incumbent MEP Maximilian Krah and Petr Bystron, a key figure in the party in Bavaria – found themselves amid a series of scandals. Krah openly relativized the crimes of the SS in World War II in an interview and has also come under scrutiny for his close ties to Russian and Chinese government structures – possibly even receiving financial compensation from their intelligence services. And his assistant has been arrested.
Bystron, who was a member of the Bundestag at the time, was accused of money laundering and corruption involving Russians. He was also under investigation for helping to infiltrate a Polish citizen arrested for spying for Russia into the Bundestag building. Bystron was stripped of his parliamentary immunity.
These events likely reduced AfD’s support among „conservative national patriots,” as the party’s voters often describe themselves. But nothing of the sort happened. Before the information about Kraj and Bystron became public, the AfD’s popularity hovered between 15 and 17 percent. Later polls put it between 14 and 16 percent. The party’s result in the European Parliament elections was 15.9%, putting it in second place in Germany. And neither federal nor state polls have shown a significant decline in AfD support.
Four months later, the AfD won the elections in Thuringia and came second in Saxony and Brandenburg. In-depth sociological studies have shown that the AfD’s voter base has developed in several German regions and in specific social niches. Simply put, some Germans are prepared to vote for the party under any circumstances, regardless of scandals or negative information that contradicts their stated beliefs. These voters see the AfD as their only representative and support its radicalism.
Radical agenda – 2025
The party’s ideologues understand this, and in the forthcoming early elections, they are offering voters perhaps the most radical proposals since the AfD’s inception. The full text of the election manifesto has not yet been released. Still, the official draft reveals that the party is calling for Germany to leave the European Union, a return to the German mark, a full restoration of Russian gas supplies, the lifting of sanctions against Russia and the pre-trial detention of asylum seekers in Germany – this would take place directly at the border.
The AfD also refuses to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and only allows abortion in exceptional cases. These proposals do not fit in with the ‘positive renewal’ expected of the party and are a hardening of previous positions. The new drafts are strikingly more radical than similar documents from other European right-wing parties.
Despite being a relative moderate, Alice Weidel does not deviate from the general line of her party. At an AfD rally in Magdeburg, the city where a terrorist attack in December claimed the lives of five visitors to a local Christmas market, she routinely blamed „Islamists” for the attack – even though the terrorist was a committed Islamophobe who had also contacted the AfD.
Nor has Weidel addressed the party’s openly homophobic stance, which not only ” rejects” so-called „pro-LGBT policies” but also mocks transgender people by claiming that it is now „possible to vote no once a year. Nor did she criticize current points in the AfD’s preliminary program, such as Germany’s exit from the EU and the eurozone, which contradict his positions as an economist. Moreover, as a candidate for chancellor, Weidel has declared that she is ready to put these theses to the voters.
The connection between Weidel and Björn Höcke is telling. While in 2017, the current AfD leader openly stated that she was willing to expel the Thuringian extremist from the party, in 2020, she found herself at odds with then-AfD co-chair Jörg Meuthen, who wanted to ban the far-right faction led by Höcke. At a meeting of the federal leadership, Weidel voted against the group’s disbandment.
Throughout 2024, the AfD consistently ranked second in national opinion polls behind the CSU/CDU (31-33%). Its popularity is currently at 17-19%, with its closest rival for second place, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), at 16-17%. The party’s support is traditionally higher in the former East Germany, where it reaches 30%. Still, contrary to stereotypes, it also enjoys significant popularity in several western regions, including the economically successful Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg (both 16%), and Hesse (17%).
So much for the past and present history of the AfD – tomorrow, we will continue with its current situation.
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Szele Tamás